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A Market Power Test for
Noncommercial Boycotts
Since the 1940's, the Supreme Court has declared that group boycotts
are per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act." Lower courts and
commentators have criticized the per se rule, arguing that group boycotts
are too broad and varied to deserve automatic condemnation.' In particu-
lar, critics argue that boycotts undertaken not for commercial or economic
gain, but for social or political reasons should be exempt from the anti-
trust laws3 or, alternatively, treated under the rule of reason.4
The Eighth Circuit responded to those suggestions in Missouri v.
NOW,' and held a politically motivated boycott exempt from the Sherman
Act.6 The Supreme Court acknowledged the NOW decision in NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co.7  and, using a political motive test, extended
1. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659-60 (1961) (per
curiam); Klor's, Inc v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild
v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941).
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), proscribes "[e]very contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States." The Supreme Court has applied a "rule of reason" to most conduct challenged under § 1,
invalidating only restraints whose anticompetitive potential outweighs any procompetitive justifica-
tions. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-66 (1911).
2. See, e.g., Products Liab. Ins. Agency v. Crum & Forster Ins. Cos., 682 F.2d 660, 663 (7th Cir.
1982) (vertical boycott is per se illegal only if purpose is to fix prices); United States Trotting Ass'n v.
Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781, 787-89 (7th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (courts should not blindly
apply per se rule to any conduct resembling a group boycott); United States v. Realty Multi-List,
Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1365-69 (5th Cir. 1980) (per se rule should not apply to conduct that results in
greater efficiency); Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deal: A Rule Ripe for Re-
examination, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 685 (1979) (suggesting a return to rule of reason for certain types
of boycotts); McCormick, Group Boycotts-Per Se or Not Per Se, That is the Question, 7 SE oN
HALL L. REV. 703 (1976) (Supreme Court has failed to define "group boycott" and formulate per se
rule adequately).
3. Comment, Political, Social and Economic Boycotts by Consumers: Do They Violate the Sherman
Act?, 17 Hous. L. REv. 775, 777 (1980); Note, NOW or Never: Is There Antitrust Liability for
Noncommercial Boycotts?, 80 COLuM. L. REv. 1317, 1319 (1980).
4. Bauer, supra note 2, at 705; Comment, Protest Boycotts Under the Sherman Act, 128 U. PA. L.
REV. 1131, 1154-61 (1980). For a third approach, see NoteJoint Ventures and Boycotts: Some Sug-
gestions on Per Se, 15 STAN. L. Rav. 638 (1963). That approach views the per se rule as shifting the
burden of proof to the defendant. The defendant could argue that the challenged practice generally
promotes efficiency and therefore deserves treatment under the rule of reason, or that application of
the antitrust laws would conflict with other legislative policies. Id. at 640.
5. 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980). The National Organization for
Women (NOW) organized a convention boycott against Missouri in order to pressure that state's
legislature to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment. The state, suing as parens patriae, sought to
enjoin the boycott as an illegal restraint of trade.
6. The court did not rest its decision on the boycott's noncommercial purpose, but relied solely on
the right of petition. Id. at 1315 n.16.
7. 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3426 n.48 (1982).
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First Amendment protection to a boycott organized by a local NAACP
chapter against white-owned businesses.'
This Note argues that the NOW and NAACP courts' approach to polit-
ical boycotts is seriously flawed. Furthermore, courts should adopt an eco-
nomic effects test rather than a political motive test. The Note therefore
proposes a market power test for "political" and other vertical boycotts.
Such a test would invalidate only boycotts that harm consumers in the
aggregate and would do so without endangering the interests of political
and social minorities.
I. POLITICAL MOTIVATION SHOULD NOT CONFER LEGALITY
A. Boycotts Defined
The term "boycott" refers to a wide spectrum of activities that vary
greatly in collusiveness and coerciveness. Protection of competitive and
First Amendment values necessitates defining those boycotts that raise
clear antitrust issues and those that raise clear First Amendment issues.
The degree of overlap will determine the difficulty of constructing a
meaningful antitrust standard.
In determining whether an antitrust violation has occurred, courts
should conclude that a simple plea not to purchase a product, coupled
with reasons why the speaker finds the product or its manufacturer objec-
tionable, is not a boycott, nor is the individual consumer's response a boy-
cott. First Amendment law and economics agree completely on this issue.
The speaker or group of speakers that urges consumers not to buy a prod-
uct adds to the available information about the product or its manufac-
turer. The First Amendment ensures the free dissemination of such infor-
mation.9 Similarly, economic theory recognizes the importance of
information in allocating goods to their most valued uses.10
8. Id. at 3425. In March 1966, a group of black citizens presented to the public officials of Port
Gibson, Mississippi, a list of "Demands for Racial Justice" that the local NAACP chapter had
adopted. It received no favorable response, and the local NAACP voted to impose a boycott on local
white merchants. On October 31, 1969, a number of the affected merchants filed a suit in state court
for damages and an injunction. Id. at 3413.
The trial court held the NAACP liable on three separate grounds: a tort claim, Mississippi's secon-
dary boycott statute, and the state antitrust statute. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed on all
but the tort claim. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 393 So. 2d 1290 (Miss. 1980), rev'd, 102
S. Ct. 3409 (1982). The United States Supreme Court held that the First Amendment precluded any
liability. 102 S. Ct. at 3427.
9. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (societal interest in free flow of commercial information mandates First Amendment protection
for advertising); see also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
563 (1980) ("The First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the informational
function of advertising.").
10. In Virginia Pharnacy Board, the Court noted that accurate price information "is indispensa-
ble to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system." 425 U.S. at 765. For this reason,
the distinction between the mere dissemination of information and active collusion is important to
antitrust law. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978) (ex-
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An economically deleterious boycott, by contrast, includes an explicit
agreement not to patronize or uses the prospect of physical or economic
harm to force potential purchasers not to buy the targeted product. Both
tactics take the place of free choice, thus harming allocative efficiency. A
"political" boycott may incorporate one or both of these tactics. By voting
in favor of a resolution directing their organization to cease holding con-
ventions in Missouri, the members of NOW made an explicit agreement
not to deal."1 The NAACP plaintiffs alleged that boycott "enforcers" used
intimidation and violence to induce blacks not to enter white-owned
stores.12
The First Amendment mandates caution in inferring agreement when
individuals or groups engage in a boycott.1 Similarly, when deciding
whether a group coerced consumers not to buy a product, the courts must
be careful not to attach liability to ambiguous acts that may fall within the
protection of the First Amendment." The courts must apply narrow defi-
nitions of "agreement" and "coercion," but when they find either, they
should subject the activity to antitrust scrutiny.
B. Economic Effects of Political Boycotts
Using a motive test 5 to determine the legality of a boycott ignores eco-
change of price data among competitors may enhance efficiency and thus is not per se illegal); R.
POSNER, ANTrrRusT LAW 136 (1976) ("In general, the more information sellers have about the
prices and output of their competitors the more efficiently the market will operate.").
11. A boycott by a group such as NOW also raises questions of freedom of association. This Note
will conclude, based on the rule of United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (individual
manufacturer may refuse to deal with anyone for any reason except to monopolize), that a boycott by
an individual group should be presumptively valid. See infra p. 539. An intergroup agreement would
trigger limited antitrust scrutiny, but such a restriction on the freedom of association serves a vital
governmental interest. See infra pp. 532-33.
12. The NAACP boycott was enforced through a variety of coercive measures, including threats
by NAACP leaders to "discipline" violators, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409,
3420 (1982), posting of "store watchers" outside targeted stores, id. at 3421, publication of violators'
names in a community newspaper, id., and occasional violent reprisals against violators, id. at
3421-22.
13. See Note, Political Boycott Activity and the First Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 659 (1978).
That Note would require an antitrust plaintiff to prove that each defendant explicitly agreed to boy-
cott. Id. at 689. Such a standard, however, would virtually preclude liability. Comment, supra note 4,
at 1161-64. Courts must have the freedom to draw reasonable inferences. Id. at 1162 n.162.
14. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3424 (1982) (speech does not lose
its protected character simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into action). Thus, a
court should require proof of a credible threat of physical or economic harm. Labor law similarly
draws a line between speech and coercion. An employer may, for example, publicize his opposition to
unionization but may not threaten to respond to unionization with reprisals. NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618-19 (1969).
15. The NOW court drew support for a motive test from dictum in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 213 n.7 (1959), stating that the Sherman Act "is aimed primarily at combina-
tions having commercial objectives and is applied only to a very limited extent to organizations, like
labor unions, which normally have other objectives." See Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301, 1310-11
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980). That dictum is both analytically and historically inaccu-
rate. Labor's experience with the antitrust laws demonstrates the Supreme Court's determination to
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nomic effects and may impair competition. It is not true, despite the claim
of some commentators,"6 that political motives will generally preclude an-
ticompetitive results. Any successful boycott uses economic pressure to
harm or bankrupt a merchant who was efficiently satisfying consumers'
needs.17 Even if the instigator does not seek a competitive advantage for
himself, he may harm competition in the market in which the targeted
business operates.1 8 The magnitude of the harm depends on the structure
of that market."9
A political boycott harms consumers generally if it harms competition
in the target's market. A political boycott exemption, therefore, does not
simply permit groups with political grievances to offset the superior eco-
nomic power of businesses that are on the opposite side of a political dis-
apply the Sherman Act to all restraints of trade. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 301 (1908)
(unions not engaged in interstate commerce not exempt from Sherman Act). Labor's freedom to boy-
cott derives from specific congressional mandates, see 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982); 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115
(1976), and not from a noncommercial purpose. Although some read Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
310 U.S. 469 (1940), to allow an inquiry into the purposes of union activities, see NOW, 620 F.2d at
1311; Klor's, 359 U.S. at 213 n.7, that opinion actually seems to separate those activities that may
tortiously interfere with business activity (e.g., violent strikes), from recognized antitrust offenses such
as boycotts. See Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 505-06 (distinguishing strikes from boycotts and noting
that Supreme Court has regularly invalidated latter). The Court's antitrust decisions outside the labor
area display a similar reluctance to use intent tests. E.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773, 787 (1975) (learned professions subject to Sherman Act despite public service objectives); United
States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 489 (1950) (price fixing illegal even if it
"serves an honorable or worthy end").
16. See, e.g., Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REv.
705, 747 (1962) (noncommercial purpose is frequently evidence that harm to competition is "insub-
stantial"); Comment, supra note 4, at 1153 (effects on competitive conditions will "almost always be
incidental").
17. Cf. R. BORK, THE ANrr'RusT PARADOX 332 (1978) (discussing Kor's case):
If the decision is to find justification in antitrust terms, it must be because the boycott con-
tained, so far as we can tell, no possibility of efficiency and did deprive consumers of an outlet
they had shown they wanted. To remove Klor's artificially was to move the distribution pat-
tern further from the optimal.
18. Both Posner and Bork argue that a boycotter will not risk harming competition in a vertically
adjacent market for fear of facilitating the creation of a monopoly that will in turn raise its price to
the boycotters. See Products Liab. Ins. Agency v. Crum & Forster Ins. Cos., 682 F.2d 660, 664 (7th
Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.); R. BORK, supra note 17, at 332. Posner argues that boycotts by themselves
are not anticompetitive; only those that seek to enforce anticompetitive practices violate the Sherman
Act. R. POSNER, supra note 10, at 208.
Those arguments are inapplicable to political boycotts. A genuinely political boycott lacks an eco-
nomic profit motive. As a result, the boycotters are indifferent to anticompetitive effects in the targets
market. They will regard any resultant price increase as a cost of achieving their political goal, even
though other consumers may not wish to bear that cost. These factors do not suffice to prove harm to
competition in all cases, but they demonstrate the inaccuracy of presuming that such harm cannot
ensue.
19. If the market is fragmented, the boycott will probably not harm competition. Removing one
competitor from a highly competitive market, while technically inefficient, will frequently not affect
price competition. See Products Liab. Ins. Agency, 682 F.2d at 663-64 (Posner, J.). If the market is
highly concentrated, however, the boycott-like any predatory behavior-may be very anticompetitive.
Cf. R. BORK, supra note 17, at 157 (successful predation may be possible if predator has over half the
relevant market). Posner also recognizes that certain vertical boycotts can harm competition. Products
Liab. Ins. Agency, 682 F.2d at 663.
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pute. Rather, it favors the welfare of an interest group over the welfare of
consumers in the aggregate. The Sherman Act is relevant to a boycott to
the extent the boycott harms consumers. Rather than concentrating on the
market effect of a boycott, however, the courts have chosen to focus on,the
motives behind it. Their use of a motive inquiry in an area for which it is
ill suited20 has produced a confused doctrine that fails to prevent anticom-
petitive boycotts, and may even encourage businesses to use them.
The NOW and NAACP decisions used a motive test that is particularly
susceptible to abuse by businesses seeking anticompetitive ends. Both the
NOW2" and NAACP " courts decided that the boycotts before them were
a form of petition protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.2 Under
Noerr, neither anticompetitive motives nor anticompetitive results would
support antitrust liability for an activity protected by the right of peti-
tion.2 Thus the NOW and NAACP decisions implicitly validate a large
set of anticompetitive boycotts. If business groups can petition the govern-
ment regardless of anticompetitive results, and if boycotts are a legitimate
form of petition, "5 then commercial groups may freely use boycotts to in-
20. See infra note 32.
21. 620 F.2d at 1312-16. Commentators have criticized the Eighth Circuit's reliance on Eastern
R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961), in ignoring the differences
between boycotts and other petition activity. See Cockerill, Application of Noerr-Pennington and the
First Amendment to Politically Motivated Economic Boycotts: Missouri v. NOW, 13 Loy. L.A.L.
REv. 85, 105-07 (1979); Comment, supra note 4, at 1136-40; Note, supra note 3, at 1322-23. In
addition, the NOW opinion overlooks the fact that Noerr was meant to permit businesses to petition.
By broadening the definition of "petition," the NOW and NAACP courts necessarily gave some pro-
tection to politically motivated boycotts by commercial groups.
22. 102 S. Ct. at 3426.
23. See Noerr, 365 U.S. 127. In Noerr, railroads waged a publicity campaign for anti-trucking
legislation for anticompetitive purposes. UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), expanded the
Noerr result to concerted attempts to influence any government officials.
The Court's opinion in NAACP rested on the First Amendment. 102 S. Ct. at 3427. That broad
holding was necessary, however, because a state tort claim was technically the only claim remaining
before the Court. Id. at 3416. The Court still used Noerr to shield the boycott from economic regula-
tion. Id. at 3426.
24. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136, 138-39.
The precise boundaries of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine are a subject of debate. See Fischel, Anti-
trust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Action The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-
Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHi. L. REV. 80 (1977) (courts should exempt only activity protected by
right of petition); Note, Limiting the Antitrust hnmunity for Concerted Attempts to Influence Courts
and Adjudicatory Agencies. Analogies to Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process, 86 HARv. L.
REv. 715 (1973) (courts should refuse to apply Noerr-Pennington to concerted litigation when action
is groundless or judgment ostensibly sought is not the real objective). The general trend just prior to
NOW was a gradual tightening of the Noerr-Pennington exemption. See, e.g., City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 400 (1978) (exclusion covers only antitrust enforcement
that severely impinges upon fundamental national policies); California Motor Transp. v. Trucking
Unltd., 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972) (applying sham exception).
25. Using Noerr as the primary vehicle for protecting political boycotts creates the additional
possibility that the courts' desire to protect a wide range of consumer boycotts will lead them to
expand Noerr to cover other types of speech besides petition. This would result in a heightened pro-
tection for speech and association in the commercial context, even when competition may suffer as a
result.
The Yale Law Journal
fluence the government. 8 Such groups could significantly increase the an-
ticompetitive effects resulting from such petitioning by boycotting local
merchants to pressure governmental officials directly-a tactic used in
both NOW and NAACP." Under the NOW doctrine, the defendants in
Noerr could have gone so far as to refuse to ship the goods of any
merchant who would not agree to lobby his state government for anti-
trucking legislation. Such an expansive definition of "political" boycotts
would permit considerable predatory business behavior."
The NOW and NAACP decisions embarked on a dangerous course by
applying Noerr to a coercive activity. Expanding the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine beyond such forms of petition as speech and the distribution of
literature makes boycotts particularly attractive to would-be monopolists.
Adding boycotts to the valid forms of petition expands a producer's oppor-
tunities to manipulate the discretion vested in government officials and
agencies to achieve anticompetitive ends." While courts theoretically will
The Burger Court has broadened First Amendment protection of corporate speech. See, e.g., Cen-
tral Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (state may not require
electric utility to cease advertising to promote consumption of electricity); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765 (1978) (state may not prohibit corporate expenditure to express views on referendum).
Such protection, however, must be based on the First Amendment, not the Noerr-Penninglon doctrine;
otherwise, the latter may shield from the antitrust laws some activity that is not protected by the First
Amendment. Fischel, supra note 24, at 94.
26. For example, in Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759, 763-69
(M.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980) (mem.), the court extended protec-
tion under Noerr-Pennington to a concerted closing of gas stations because it was intended to protest
federal energy policy.
27. It is unlikely that a boycott would directly target a governmental agency. Opportunities to put
pressure on a state through its industries, however, are plentiful, as both NOW and NAACP show.
28. It is not difficult to find a "political" dispute in a business context, as Noerr demonstrates.
One consequence of the scope of modern governmental regulation is that most significant business
decisions are subject to some regulatory limitations. Thus, by changing the focus of disagreement from
the decision itself to the regulatory context, as in Noerr, a competitor can easily create a colorable
"political" dispute to justify nearly any predatory behavior.
Indeed, the Court recently refused to broaden the scope of permissible commercial speech because of
a similar concern. In Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 581
(1980) (Stevens, J., concurring), Justice Stevens suggested that the First Amendment should protect
promotional advertising relevant to a current political issue. The majority, however, felt that such a
doctrine would blur the distinction between commercial and political speech. "[M]any, if not most,
products may be tied to public concerns with the environment, energy, economic policy, or individual
health and safety." Id. at 562-63 n.5.
29. Misuse of governmental processes is a common and effective form of monopolization. See P.
BORK, supra note 17, at 347-64. Business groups have used federal safety, environmental, and other
regulations to protect existing firms from competition. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN & W. HASsLER,
CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AnR 31 (1981) (Clean Air Act requirement of scrubbers for all new coal-
burning power plants inspired in part by producers of high-sulfur coal seeking competitive advantage
over producers of low-sulfur coal); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. &
MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971) (analyzing output of regulators in terms of industry demand for beneficial
regulation and regulators' supply of same).
A business group could use the expanded right of petition as an important step in manipulating
government officials. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), provides an exam-
ple. When the defendant electric utility's exclusive franchises for several towns expired, the towns
attempted to establish municipal distribution systems. Id. at 371. Otter Tail refused to sell power at
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not apply Noerr where the activity "is a mere sham to cover what is actu-
ally nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business
relationships of a competitor,"30 the sham exception remains weak and
confused.3 1 Protecting competition against boycotts requires a more funda-
mental doctrinal revision.
The NOW/NAACP approach follows the Noerr sham exception by us-
ing a motive test to determine the legality of a boycott. This focus on the
motives behind the boycott is inadvisable, however, because any inquiry
into subjective motivations is inherently imprecise, and will produce costly
mistakes.32 An attempt to reduce these error costs cannot succeed com-
pletely,38 and will require an intrusive examination into the sincerity of
the boycotting group's political convictions.
A consistent exemption for noncommercial boycotts must tolerate any
motive other than the desire for monopoly profit." This leaves a vast area
wholesale or use its lines to "wheel" power from other wholesale sellers to the municipal systems,
thus making the cost of such systems prohibitively high. Id. at 371-72. By successfully "petitioning"
the town governments through a boycott, Otter Tail gained a governmentally protected monopoly for
10 to 20 years. See id. at 369.
30. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.
31. See Fischel, supra note 24, at 104-06 (identification of "sham" arrangements plagued by
confusion); see also supra note 28 (in a highly regulated society, producer can easily inject a plausible
political objective into most business decisions). In addition, even an analytically rigorous sham excep-
tion would not guard against commercial boycotts sincerely intended to influence government action.
32. The same problems arise in any branch of the law that requires a motive inquiry, such as
criminal or antidiscrimination law. The reasons for tolerating those costs, however, are inapplicable to
antitrust.
Courts traditionally require proof of criminal intent for crimes derived from the common law. See
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-63 (1952). That requirement reflects a view that only
a malicious will deserves societal condemnation. No such requirement exists, however, for "public
welfare" statutes, which seek primarily to regulate, not to stigmatize. See id. at 252-56.
A closer analogy to an "anticompetitive intent" standard is the "discriminatory intent" standard
announced in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (statute or other official act violates equal
protection clause only if purpose to discriminate is shown). But that standard applies only to official
conduct challenged on equal protection grounds. Id. at 247-48. Furthermore, critics have argued that
the discriminatory intent standard subverts the process of attaining racial equality. See, e.g., Perry,
The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 540, 557-58
(1977) (social and economic disadvantages create potential for facially neutral laws to disproportion-
ately burden blacks); Note, Making the Violation Fit the Remedy: The Intent Standard and Equal
Protection Law, 92 YAuE L.J. 328, 349 (1982) (intent standard has "ominously restricted the capacity
of disadvantaged minorities to vindicate constitutional rights").
A detailed inquiry into the cause of animosity between the boycott organizers and their victims
would severely undercut Sherman Act enforcement. Even the intent test contemplated in Washington
v. Davis is less subjective than an inquiry into the sincerity of political motives. "It is unrealistic...
to require the victim of alleged discrimination to uncover the actual subjective intent of the deci-
sionmaker. . . ." Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring).
33. There are two types of error costs involved: e. (political boycotts held economic), and e. (eco-
nomic boycotts held political). The magnitude of each depends on whether the courts will accept any
political motive, however ancillary, or will validate only boycotts whose primary goal is political. The
former test produces a large el; the latter both produces a large e, and creates a risk of arbitrary
results, cf infra p. 531 (discussing judicial discretion). If the First Amendment requires that el be
reduced to zero, the price will be an extremely high es.
34. An antitrust exemption for politically motivated boycotts must derive either from the antitrust
laws themselves, see Coons, supra note 16, at 707 (political boycotts outside "traditional market mi-
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where commercial and political objectives overlap. A dispute among busi-
nessmen may include substantial disagreements over moral, social, or po-
litical issues.35 A practice that seems smart and competitive to its origina-
tor may seem unfair, illegal, or contrary to public policy to rival
merchants. 36
Moreover, political disputes may involve the opportunity for economic
gain. The NAACP boycott sought increased hiring of blacks-an "eco-
nomic" objective 7-and a number of the boycott organizers were partial
owners of a grocery and clothing store that profited greatly from the boy-
cott.38 Even if no political dispute exists ex ante, the boycotters can easily
invent one if litigation ensues. Finally, the analysis of intent is especially
problematic if the defendant is an organization like the NAACP or a bus-
iness corporation rather than a solitary individual. 9 Any large institution
is a battleground for competing interests,40 and the difficulty of ascribing a
"motive" to an institutional actor further complicates an exception for po-
litical boycotts.
Limiting the exemption to political boycotts by consumers, as some
commentators advocate,"1 would decrease but not eliminate uncertainty
and mistakes."' No bright line clearly separates producers from consum-
lieu" that is concern of antitrust laws), or the First Amendment, see Note, supra note 3, at 1331
(political boycott exemption may further First Amendment rights). But the only motivation objection-
able on antitrust grounds is the desire to gain a monopoly profit. Similarly, a person's rights under the
First Amendment to express his views, through a boycott or otherwise, cannot turn on the content of
the views expressed. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (First Amendment does not permit
regulation of expression based on message, ideas, subject matter, or content). Thus, any exemption
must cover boycotts motivated by any political, social, or public policy concerns, or by plain animos-
ity-in short, anything other than the desire for monopoly profits.
35. See, e.g., Young v. Motion Picture Ass'n, 299 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir.) (refusal to hire "commu-
nist" screenwriters and actors), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 922 (1962); Konecky v. Jewish Press, 288 F.
179, 180 (8th Cir. 1923) (instigation of concerted refusal to deal by one newspaper publisher against
another allegedly motivated by "personal malice"); Hughes Tool Co. v. Motion Picture Ass'n, 66 F.
Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) (association of film producers and distributors pressured exhibitors to
show only films bearing association's "seal of approval" awarded to morally inoffensive films and
advertisements).
36. See Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Noncommercial Concerted Refusals to Deal, 1970
DUKE L.J. 247, 264-66 (illustrating with cases the difficulty of distinguishing between boycotts for
economic advantage and ones that aim to prevent unfair or illegal trading practices).
37. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3419 (1982). For a detailed listing of
the NAACP's demands, see NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 393 So. 2d 1290, 1295-96 (Miss.
1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982).
38. Brief of Respondents at 45, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982).
39. See Note, supra note 32, at 336 ("The subjective intent of corporate bodies is at best a nebu-
lous concept . . ").
40. See Starr, Accommdation and Accountability: A Strategy for Judicial Enforcement of Institu-
tional Reform Decrees, 32 ALA. L. REV. 399, 402-03 (1981) (many operational practices of a large
organization result from accommodation of competing interest groups).
41. See Note, supra note 3, at 1319 n.16 (consumers with political motives may use boycotts).
42. In addition, such a test might not pass constitutional scrutiny. The Burger Court has nar-
rowed the gap between the political rights of corporations and individuals, see First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (state may not prohibit corporate expenditure to influence opinion on
referendum), and has disallowed many legislative restrictions on the political and social benefits which
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ers. Many non-profit and non-commercial groups affect commerce,' and
such groups may receive money and support from businesses."" More im-
portant, any right to use political boycotts keeps the emphasis on subjec-
tive motivations rather than market effect.
Any rule exonerating political boycotts will encourage a boycotting
group or a potential monopolist to emphasize political motivations and
conceal commercial ones,"5 and an ambiguous definition of "political"
boycotts will make it difficult for a court to avoid mistakes. The impreci-
sion of a motive test, moreover, leaves a court with considerable discretion
and little guidance. If an antitrust case is transformed into a contest be-
tween competing moral standards, the judge is left with only her own
moral values and policy preferences to shape her decision. This creates a
risk that the definition of "political" will turn in part on the popularity or
orthodoxy of the group and its cause.'" In addition to threatening the
rights of minorities directly, a vague, discretionary standard hurts all con-
sumers by drastically broadening the category of boycotts that a court
might find valid, and thereby increasing the probability of anticompetitive
effects.
wealth can purchase, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrTUToNAL LAw § 16-56, at 1134-35 (1978).
While there are some political rights that individuals possess exdusively,such as the right to vote, the
Court might be unwilling to deny a powerful economic and expressive tool such as the boycott to
corporations while providing it to individuals.
43. Examples are trade associations and other non-profit groups composed of businessmen or pro-
fessionals. The courts routinely invalidate boycotts used to pursue what these groups regard as sound
public policy. See National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (ban on
competitive bidding); American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943) (refusal to coop-
erate with group prepaid health plan).
The actions of groups of private citizens working for the public welfare may also restrain trade. See
American Mercury, Inc. v. Chase, 13 F.2d 224 (D. Mass. 1926) (private organization scrutinized
publications looking for violations of law and threatened publishers of offending works with prosecu-
tion); Community Blood Bank v. FTC, 405 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1969) (private voluntary association
refused to use blood that had been purchased from donors).
44. See NAACP at Crossroads. Time for a New Direction?, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1983, at A19,
col. 1 (most of NAACP's funding comes from corporations and foundations). For a detailed descrip-
tion of the economic aspects of political and other non-profit associations, see Hansmann, The Role of
Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980).
45. For example, in National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 684-85
(1978), a professional society attempted to justify a rule forbidding competitive bidding by claiming
that price competition among engineers endangered the public safety. That claim is typical of "public
policy" considerations raised by professional associations in defense of anticompetitive ethical rules.
See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786 (1975) (bar association claimed minimum
fee schedule furthered profession's public service objectives); United States v. National Ass'n of Real
Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 488 (1950) (code of ethics required that all real estate brokers charge
standard commission).
46. This flaw is even more pronounced in proposed tests that more readily afford protection to a
boycott if its goals correspond to a "specific object of policy." Coons, supra note 16, at 749. Minorities
who seek to change the social or political status quo would probably not pass such a test. See Com-
ment, Political Boycotts and the Sherman Act, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 617, 627 (1980); see also Note,
supra note 13, at 661-62 (1978) (ad hoc balancing test too dependent on shifting ideologies).
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C. Boycotts and the First Amendment
Boycotts not only are objectionable on grounds of efficiency, but also
deserve less First Amendment protection than other protest activities.
While boycotts may contain elements of speech,47 association,"8 and peti-
tion,"9 they also introduce collusive economic pressure into political dis-
putes.50 A truly effective boycott succeeds not by persuading, but by forc-
ing a choice between political capitulation and economic bankruptcy."1
The claim that political boycotts are a form of protected speech therefore
possesses little merit.52 The category of protected political speech is broad,
but the most vigorous arguments, exhortations, and threats still allow the
target more freedom than does direct economic pressure. The former can
promise only adverse publicity, embarrassment, or ostracism; the latter
holds the victim's very livelihood hostage until he changes his political
position. However laudable the goals behind a boycott, courts should not
allow a private group to dictate who will have access to the market and on
what terms.
The confusion between economic coercion and protected speech is un-
necessary; it is possible to draw a line between them that does not unduly
infringe First Amendment rights. Indeed, Congress and the Supreme
Court have already done so for labor boycotts. The Court has held that
the First Amendment protects peaceful picketing and distribution of liter-
ature to publicize a labor dispute.58 At the same time, however, Congress
has prohibited labor unions from using secondary boycotts"-even those
47. See Note, supra note 3, at 1331-36.
48. See id. at 1339.
49. See id. at 1337-38.
50. See Kennedy, Political Boycotts, the Sherman Act, and the First Amendment: An Accommoda-
tion of Competing Interests, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 983, 1008 (1982) (boycott is a means of altering
behavior without engaging in reasoned persuasion to secure voluntary compliance; government has
clear interest in regulating that coercive aspect).
51. A boycott operates with respect to its target in a manner wholly unrelated to speech. The
Supreme Court has recognized the distinction between speech and economic coercion implemented
through speech. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618-19 (1969) (distinguishing
between employer's objective prediction of consequences of unionization and threats of retaliation);
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 543-44 (1945) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("once [one] uses the
economic power which he has over other men and their jobs to influence their action, he is doing more
than exercising the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment").
52. A political boycott may, of course, include speech, but the economic and speech components
can be separated. See infra pp. 532-33 (arguing that such separation has occurred in the labor boycott
area). Even if the separation is imperfect, the rule announced in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968), should validate regulation of economic activities (such as boycotts) that incidentally in-
fringes on political speech. The Court in O'Brien allowed regulation of symbolic speech that advanced
an important governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of speech. Id. at 377. For an excel-
lent treatment of the First Amendment issue in boycott cases, see Comment, supra note 4, at 1144-48.
53. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940).
54. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B)
(1976); see also NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 616 (1980)
(plurality opinion) (§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) does not violate First Amendment).
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imposed purely for political reasons.55 Congress did so to restrict the scope
of labor conflict,56 and the Sherman Act should similarly limit the scope of
political boycotts in order to protect all consumers. More generally, the
Supreme Court has permitted regulation of speech if that speech, regard-
less of content, unduly interferes with the rights of others. 57 A boycott, of
course, interferes not only with the economic right to make independent
business decisions but also with the political right to choose freely which
causes to support and which not to support.
Congressional regulation of "political" boycotts is similarly justified as
a protection of the political process itself. Congress regularly applies re-
straints to political activities to ensure fairness. It has, for example, passed
laws controlling the conduct of election campaigs, 58 forbidding intimida-
tion or coercion of voters,59 and prohibiting lying before government offi-
cials.60 Regulation of political protest to prevent economic coercion seems
equally valid-and necessary to protect the integrity of the legislative
process.
Finally, boycotts can suppress political dissent as well as express it.61
Side by side with the NAACP and NOW boycotts stand the motion pic-
ture industry's boycott of screenwriters and actors suspected of communist
leanings, 2 and the refusals of some Southern merchants to sell to blacks
who registered to vote.63 A commitment to civil liberties does not unam-
biguously determine the proper reach of the Sherman Act.6"
55. See, e.g., International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982) (re-
fusal to handle cargo bound to or from Soviet Union to protest invasion of Afghanistan).
56. Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 100 (1958) (Congress "aimed
to restrict the area of industrial conflict" by prohibiting coercion of neutral employers).
57. Comment, supra note 4, at 1147 (citing, inter alia, Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728
(1970) (Congress may prohibit vendor from mailing advertisements to any individual who requests
that his name be removed from mailing list)).
58. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 597 (1976) (making or soliciting expenditure to any person to influence
that person's vote illegal); id. § 600 (promise of government employment in return for political activ-
ity illegal).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 594 (1976).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1976).
61. See, e.g., I.P.C. Distribs. v. Chicago Motion Picture Mach. Operators Union, 132 F. Supp.
294 (N.D. Ill. 1955) (concerted refusal of projectionists' union to show allegedly communist film);
Council of Defense v. International Magazine Co., 267 F. 390 (8th Cir. 1920) (boycott of Hearst
publications to protest William Randolph Hearst's allegedly pro-German sympathies).
62. See Young v. Motion Picture Ass'n, 299 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 922
(1962); Note, "Political" Blacklisting in the Motion Picture Industry: A Sherman Act Violation, 74
YALE LJ. 567 (1965).
63. See United States v. Beaty, 288 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1961) (per curiam).
64. Comment, supra note 4, at 1134 n.20. One might argue that the boycotts described above are
atypical. Boycotts should theoretically be most useful to a cohesive minority that can exploit its low
organizational costs and the intensity of its political preferences to achieve success out of proportion to
its numbers. Cf. A. DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMocRAcy 55-60 (1957) (demonstrating
how coalition of minorities with strong preferences can defeat majority with weak preferences). It is
also true, however, that the intensity of certain majority beliefs, such as racial prejudice, has sustained
prolonged refusals to deal. Indeed, discrimination against blacks and women has proceeded largely
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II. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO BOYCOTTS
A. The Economics of Boycotts
This Note has argued that the commercial/political distinction may fail
to prevent the anticompetitive effects of a boycott. Instead, courts should
classify boycotts according to the horizontal or vertical nature of the re-
straint. A per se rule is appropriate for horizontal boycotts, but not for
vertical boycotts. A market power test for vertical boycotts-the category
into which political boycotts fall-would protect economic competition
while providing adequate safeguards for political rights.
1. Horizontal Boycotts
In a horizontal boycott, the instigators compete, or seek to compete,
with the target. The instigators usually coerce or convince an intermediate
victim to discontinue commercial dealings with the target. Thus, in Fash-
ion Originators' Guild v. FTC,5 a trade association of dress designers
threatened to boycott retailers (the intermediate victims) unless the latter
refused to purchase dresses from the targeted designers. Groups of retail-
ers achieved similar results in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores6 and
United States v. General Motors17 by asking manufacturers to refuse to
deal with the retailers' competitors.6"
The unifying factor in these boycotts is that the instigator wishes to
eliminate competitors or competitive practices. The Supreme Court devel-
oped a per se rule against horizontal boycotts because it felt that such
boycotts nearly always injure competition.69 The per se rule causes occa-
sional problems, however, when applied to horizontal boycotts that are
incidental to a joint venture.70 In some cases, a group of competitors with
through the denial of certain economic relationships. Since constitutional adjudication has not stopped
private discrimination, minority plaintiffs should consider using the Sherman Act to secure economic
rights. See, e.g., Bratcher v. Akron Area Bd. of Realtors, 381 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1967) (per curiam)
(allegation of conspiracy to keep blacks from purchasing or renting in white neighborhoods states
cause of action under Sherman Act); Marcus, Civil Rights and the Anti-Trust Laws, 18 U. CI. L.
REv. 171 (1951) (antitrust laws can be used to protect civil rights).
65. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
66. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
67. 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
68. General Motors, 384 U.S. at 133-34; Klor's, 359 U.S. at 209. Competitors may deal fre-
quently with one another, as do stockbrokers and real estate agents. The instigators can then boycott
the target directly without using an intermediate victim..See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373
U.S. 341 (1963) (stock exchange discontinued without notice plaintiff's private wire and stock ticker
service). Alternatively, the instigators can refuse to trade with a supplier or customer to prevent the
latter from integrating vertically to compete with the instigators. See Eastern States Retail Lumber
Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914) (lumber retailers circulated blacklist of whole-
salers who made retail sales).
69. See cases cited supra note 1. In each case, the Court invalidated a boycott intended to harm a
competitor of the boycotting group.
70. The features that distinguish a joint venture from other interfirm contractual relationships are
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an ongoing business relationship develop a collective asset to simplify their
dealings.7 ' To encourage investment in efficient combinations, courts have
allowed the investors to exclude competitors to bar free riders.72 Alterna-
tively, an industry may want to set safety or quality standards for its
products..7  A court might permit a refusal to award the "seal of approval"
to a competitor's product, even though such action will lead consumers to
cease buying the product. Analogously, courts have allowed certain combi-
nations to fix prices when large efficiency gains could result. 4 Courts
have thus recognized the importance of promoting efficient organizational




In a vertical boycott, the instigators and target are in a buyer-seller
relationship.76 Any boycott by consumers, therefore, must fall into this
the partial or total integration of operations and the potential for an expansion of output. See Brodley,
Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARv. L. Rxv. 1521, 1524-25 (1982). Brodley formally
defines a joint venture as an integration of operations in which the following conditions are present:
(I) the enterprise is under the joint control of the parent firms, which are not under common control;
(2) each parent makes a substantial contribution to the venture; (3) the enterprise exists as a separate
business entity; and (4) the venture creates new productive capacity, new technology, a new product,
or entry into a new market. Id. at 1526. Bork refers to boycotts incorporating a total or partial
integration as "ancillary" boycotts. R. BORK, supra note 17, at 337-38.
71. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (cooperative association of
publishers to exchange news among members); United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d
1351 (5th Cir. 1980) (multiple listing service for real estate brokers); Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit
& Produce Bldg., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.) (building located near shipping facilities used as wholesale
produce market for, and controlled by, local dealers), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952).
72. See United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980) (restrictive crite-
ria for membership in real estate multiple listing service not per se illegal); Worthen Bank & Trust v.
National Bankamericard Inc., 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973) (bank credit card system's by-laws re-
stricting membership not per se illegal), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974). If the asset confers monop-
oly power, however, a court may require that the owners grant access to competitors. See United
States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
73. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (per
curiam) (association of appliance manufacturers and utilities awarded seal of approval to gas-burning
appliances supposedly based on safety and quality criteria); Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir
Plywood Ass'n, 261 F. Supp. 154 (D. Or. 1966) (trade association may set quality standards), aff'd
per curian, 399 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969).
74. In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (ASCAP), the
Court held that an association formed to protect the copyrights of its members could refuse to license
individual compositions without violating the per se rule against price fixing. The association granted
only a "blanket license" allowing unlimited use of all compositions in the association's repertory.
75. Brodley proposes an approach that would evaluate a joint venture's anticompetitive potential
by analyzing the competitive relationship between the joint venture and its parent firms, the market
power of the joint venture and its parents, and the restraints ancillary to the venture. Brodley, supra
note 70, at 1540. Remedies would be carefully tailored to remove the threat to competition without
destroying the potential for increased output. Id. at 1544.
76. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l Pictures, 282 U.S. 44 (1930) (refusal of film distributors
to deal with certain exhibitors); Williams v. St. Joseph Hosp., 629 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1980) (refusal
of doctors to treat any person who had filed a malpractice suit against any doctor in area).
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category. Some joint ventures also incorporate vertical boycotts." Finally,
a group that competes in some respects may find it necessary to cooperate
in others to offer its product,78  and that combination may wish to put
some restrictions on the sale of its joint-input product. 9 Although vertical
boycotts do not seek to harm competitors through predation, cartels may
employ vertical boycotts to facilitate collusion and thereby diminish com-
petition in their market.80
Since the restraint is vertical rather than horizontal, and since it is pos-
sible that the combination may produce greater efficiencies, a rule of rea-
son treatment may initially seem appropriate.Bl Under the rule of reason,
however, a restraint must offer potential pro-competitive justifications."2
The joint venture boycotts may offer such justifications, but political boy-
cotts cannot. Like cartels, they substitute collective pressure for the indi-
vidual consumptive or productive decisions that comprise the free market.
Drawing upon Justice Brandeis' formulation of the rule of reason in
Chicago Board of Trade,8 3 some commentators have suggested that politi-
cal purpose should be relevant to the reasonableness inquiry as evidence of
a probable lack of anticompetitive effect.84 But part of the reason for es-
chewing a commercial-or-political motive test is the difficulty of defining
political boycotts with sufficient precision to assure that no anticompetitive
boycotts will escape condemnation. 5
77. An example is ASCAP, 441 U.S. 1, discussed supra note 74. The horizontal effect of the
restraint was similar to price fixing since competing composers agreed to license their works on identi-
cal terms, but the blanket license also resembled a vertical refusal to deal, because the association
refused to license individual compositions to broadcasters.
78. The best examples are sports leagues. Courts have allowed such leagues to determine and
enforce uniform eligibility rules for athletes. See United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs
Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781, 788-91 (7th Cir. 1981) (en bane) (harness racing association's by-laws designed
to ensure honest racing events not per se illegal); Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165
(9th Cir.) (PGA may set and enforce eligibility rules to limit size and ensure quality of tournaments),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966). But see Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (NFL draft unreasonable but not per se illegal).
79. An example is the refusal to grant individual licenses in ASCAP, 441 U.S. 1. See supra note
74.
80. In Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930), the Court struck
down a concerted refusal of film distributors to deal with exhibitors except under industry-wide stan-
dard contracts. See also cases cited supra note 76.
81. See McCormick, supra note 2, at 736 (boycotts condemned by Supreme Court have been
horizontal; less restrictive standard appropriate for vertical boycotts); cf. Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (striking down per se rule in favor of rule of reason for
vertical market division).
82. See National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-92 (1978).
83. See Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918):
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a
good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
84.. Coons, supra note 16, at 747-48; Comment, supra note 4, at 1157-60.
85. See supra pp. 529-30.
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B. Market Power and Vertical Boycotts
Each of the conflicting goals at stake in boycott cases-protecting com-
petition, preserving First Amendment rights, and preventing widespread
use of economic coercion-deserves attention. For vertical boycotts, a focus
on the market power of the boycott would best answer those concerns.
Such a test would invalidate any vertical boycott with more than a speci-
fied amount of market power, regardless of the reasons for the boycott. A
market power test is consistent with the goals of antitrust policy.8 It is
more objective than a motive test and would therefore guard more reliably
against anticompetitive effects in the instigators' market. Finally, it would
protect competition in the target's market.
The market power test, moreover, is a general rule that courts can ap-
ply uniformly regardless of the motivation behind the boycott or the iden-
tity of the boycotting group. This broad applicability provides a restraint
on judicial discretion and an important safeguard for politically unpopular
groups, which would not be required to convince a judge of the propriety
or sincerity of their goals.
The emphasis on market power will also help to protect First Amend-
ment rights.8" It will assure that the right to use a boycott to express a
grievance will not depend on the content of the ideas expressed, and will
affirm the primacy of reasoned persuasion on the scale of First Amend-
ment values. The narrow antitrust definition of "boycott" will already
have screened out those boycotts that most deserve First Amendment
protection."8
Of course, if the court finds a horizontal restraint hidden in a vertical
boycott, it can disregard the market power inquiry. Moreover, since a suc-
cessful cartel will possess significant market power, the market power test
should identify any camouflaged horizontal restraints that escape per se
treatment. The refusal to allow all competitors in a given market to com-
86. Boycotts are, of course, traditionally analyzed under § 1. But vertical boycotts bear a close
resemblance to § 2 offenses. In fact, there is growing authority for a market power requirement in
some § 1 cases, including vertical boycotts. See Landes & Posner, Market Power in Afititrust Cases,
94 HARV. L. REv. 937, 956 n.35 (1981) (citing, inter alia, Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 563 F.2d
54, 56 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'd on rehearing en banc, 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946
(1978)).
87. In his NOW dissent, Judge Gibson argued that the majority had misunderstood its role in
harmonizing the Sherman Act with the First Amendment. He advocated balancing defendants' First
Amendment rights against the state's interest in preventing certain forms of economic behavior. Mis-
souri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301, 1324-26 (8th Cir.) (Gibson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842
(1980).
88. See infra pp. 524-25. One might argue that the very existence of a boycott is a form of
symbolic speech. See Note, supra note 13, at 683. Limiting the size of a boycott, however, would not
strip it of symbolic significance.
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bine to pressure a supplier or customer for any reason will also discourage
the use of economic coercion.89
C. The Market Power Standard in Practice
Both the NOW and NAACP boycotts involved some amount of market
power.90 The courts must ultimately decide how much market power is
tolerable and, as in other contexts, that decision will be imprecise. 1 Yet it
is possible to establish some guidelines.
A market power test should invalidate only those boycotts that pose a
genuine threat to competition, and thus to consumer interests. It would
not permit only ineffective boycotts. As previously noted, harming the tar-
get-or forcing capitulation-is not always equivalent to harming compe-
tition.92 A discrete and insular minority will be able to exploit the margi-
nal effects of its collective purchasing decisions without running afoul of a
market power standard.9" Furthermore, the social cost of a boycott de-
89. A boycott is self-deterring because waging it is costly. While refusing to deal with the target,
the boycotters must either forego utility they would otherwise gain from the target's product, or seek
out an alternative, and presumably costlier, supplier. The costs of waging a boycott fall, however, as
its market power rises. A group with a high market share can cause a greater revenue loss over a
given time period than a group with a low market share. A high market share also makes it more
difficult for the target to attract fringe buyers. The target must lower his price more to attract a given
number of fringe purchasers, assuming a constant demand elasticity. For a similar calculation in the
monopoly context, see Landes & Posner, supra note 86, at 947. Since such a boycott will cause
greater harm over a given time period than one with a low market share, it should force capitulation
earlier. A group with a 100% market share can force concessions almost instantaneously by threaten-
ing to boycott. Such a boycott is not self-deterring; rather, the group will be able to use it even in
trivial disputes.
90. The trial court in NAACP found that the twelve complainants lost an aggregate total of
$606,357 in business earnings during the six-year boycott. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 393
So. 2d 1290, 1303 (Miss. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982). The NOW boycott caused an esti-
mated revenue loss of over S19 million. Missouri v. NOW, 467 F. Supp. 289, 297 (W.D. Mo. 1979),
aff'd, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa)
(Learned Hand, J.) (90% market share is sufficient to constitute a monopoly, 60% would be doubtful,
and 33% would not constitute a monopoly). For a more rigorous definition, see Landes & Posner,
supra note 86 (defining market power as the ability to raise price above marginal cost).
92. See supra p. 526; Kennedy, supra note 50, at 992 (anticompetitive results follow only where
group has market power and imperfections are present in market). The Landes and Posner formula-
tion is more sophisticated in that it incorporates the so-caled "imperfections" within the definition of
market power by deriving market power as a function of the supply elasticity of fringe firms. See
Landes & Posner, supra note 86, at 985-86.
Of course, knowing the boycotters' market power does not directly indicate the structure of the
target's market, which is a vital factor in estimating the amount of harm the boycott will cause.
Several variables that would indicate a low probability of anticompetitive effects in the targeted firm's
market, however-particularly a high demand elasticity on the part of the non-boycotting consumers,
and a high market supply elasticity for the product-will also reduce the magnitude of the boycotters'
market power. (Notes on file with author).
93. Cf Comment, supra note 4, at 1160-61 (improbable that protest boycott would have high
market power).
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pends on the size of the affected market.9 ' The prohibitive level of market
power should vary with the size of the market.
If a boycott is carried out by only one entity-if NOW by itself had
refused to hold conventions in Missouri-the presumption should be that
the boycott lacked market power. 5 Under United States v. Colgate &
Co.," an individual may refuse to deal with anyone for any reason.97
Since General Motors could refuse to hold business meetings in Missouri
until the state ratified the ERA, it would be anomalous to forbid NOW
from doing so.
If "individual" refusals to deal by consumer or political groups are pre-
sumptively valid, trade associations and groups of merchants may claim
individual status for their refusals to deal as well. Such a group may ar-
gue that although its members ordinarily compete with one another, their
interests are identical in a particular dispute.9 Such an argument would
make sense, however, only if horizontal boycotts were the sole problem.
Once we accept the relevance of market power, it is absurd to claim that
an association of merchants presumptively lacks market power. Clearly,
"individual" status should attach only to groups consisting solely of natu-
ral persons.
A market power test for vertical boycotts puts monopolists and monop-
sonists on the same footing. This symmetrical treatment is workable be-
cause we can analyze monopsony power in the same way as monopoly
power." Such treatment is also desirable, because the social cost resulting
from monopsony is similar to that resulting from monopoly.100
94. Landes & Posner, supra note 86, at 953.
95. The NOW dissent stated that the antitrust laws would permit NOW individually to boycott
states that had not ratified the ERA and to publicize that action. Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301,
1323 n.13 (8th Cir.) (Gibson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980). It is unlikely that a
single political organization would have prohibitively great market power. That presumption would
not, however, displace the market power standard. Its function would be one of administrative
convenience.
A boycott is in part an exercise of the freedom of association. See supra note 11. While the pro-
posed market power test does not confer absolute protection to the associational aspects of a boycott, a
presumption in favor of single-group boycotts would explicitly offer political groups an opportunity to
offset the economic power of business groups.
96. 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
97. The decision recognized an exception for refusals to deal "to create or maintain a monopoly."
Id. at 307.
98. See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (trade association used
boycott to stop alleged tortious interference with its property rights); Washington State Bowling Pro-
prietors Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371, 376 (9th Cir.) (invalidating rule limiting eligibility
for bowling tournaments to persons who do their tournament bowling exclusively at establishments
approved by defendants, despite claim that rule necessary to preserve integrity of sport), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 963 (1966).
99. The Landes and Posner formulation can be applied to monopsonists by defining their Lerner
index as the reciprocal of the supply elasticity facing the monopsonist, which is in turn a function of
the market supply elasticity and the monopsonist's market share. (Notes on file with author).
100. Both monopoly and monopsony create a social deadweight loss. Like a monopolist, a monop-
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Courts have only recently begun to appreciate the problem of monop-
sony buying power.'0 1 The use of an inquiry into market power at all
stages of a chain of distribution in examining a practice traditionally ana-
lyzed under section 1 might prove successful in other situations, particu-
larly when agreement is difficult to prove.'0 2
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in NAACP opens the door to widespread
abuse of boycotts. Attempts to distinguish between commercially motivated
and politically motivated boycotts allow potentially anticompetitive results.
Neither the Sherman Act nor the First Amendment mandates such an
imprecise inquiry. Instead, courts should be concerned with the impact of
a boycott in all affected markets, not only because the strictly horizontal
effects may be difficult to isolate, but also because economic coercion
should not be a favored tool for seeking commercial or political advantage.
In examining boycotts that appear to have no horizontal effects, the courts
should look to the market power generated by the boycott as an estimate
of its effect on consumer welfare.
-Paul G. Mahoney
sonist may either passively extract his profits or engage in active predation such as a boycott. For a
formal analysis of monopsony, see R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTiTRuST: CASES, ECONOMIC
NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 148-50 (2d ed. 1981).
101. The Supreme Court first recognized the problem of monopsony buying in Mandeville Island
Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948). The only three sugar refiners in a
local market agreed to pay a uniform price for beets. The Court held that the practice violated § 1,
stating "[t]he statute does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors,
or to sellers. Nor does it immunize the outlawed acts because they are done by any of these." Id. at
236.
Recently, a number of courts have struggled with the significance of monopsony power. See Wil-
liams v. St. Joseph Hosp., 629 F.2d 448, 453 (7th Cir. 1980) (monopsony and monopoly equally
objectionable); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1158-59 (5th Cir. 1979) (concluding
that while monopsony is as harmful as monopoly, it is not more so, and therefore will not confer
standing on an indirect seller), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980).
102. For example, in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939), a group of
film distributors were found to have conspired to fix prices despite the lack of evidence of an explicit
agreement, even though it seems clear that the real blame lay with monopsonistic theater owners who
forced the distributors to adopt the price-maintenance scheme. See id. at 215-18.
An examination of market power would also have been helpful in American Column & Lumber
Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921). There, the Court struck down a system for exchanging
production, price, and inventory information and projections among competing sellers of lumber. The
Court concluded that the information exchange was conducive to noncompetitive pricing. Id. at 409.
The Court erred in not examining the market to which the defendants sold. The market for lumber
may have been dominated by a few powerful buyers. See R. POSNER, supra note 10, at 141 & n.15. If
so, the likelihood of 365 sellers fixing prices without even agreeing to do so is very slim.
